

NPIC ROUTING SLIP

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CIA-RDP78B05708A000500070008-4

FROM:

Acting DDIT

DATE:

20 Jan

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REMARKS:

File: Photography 2

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17 January 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence**SUBJECT :** Status of COMUSMACV Use of U-2 Photography in Saigon**REFERENCE :** (a) Headquarters OUF cable Spectre 1704, 13 January 1964
(b) Saigon 3775, 14 January 1964
(c) Saigon 3824, 16 January 1964

1. This memorandum is for your information concerning the recent support which has been given COMUSMACV for using the U-2 photography recently acquired from the area and an assessment of MACV's capability to make maximum use of it.

2. With the receipt of film from the first two BANDSAW missions, flown with the 112A camera on 29 and 30 December, the following actions, coordinated by COMOR, were initiated:

a. Immediate Photo Interpretation Reports (IPIRs) from NPIC were cabled to MACV and COS, Saigon. From these advanced reports, MACV was able to review target requirements and make specific requests to NPIC for enlargements. Thirty-nine such enlargements, each with a PI report attached, have been sent to Saigon.

b. In the meantime, arrangements were made to duplicate the entire take of the film from these two missions, and eleven crates, consisting of one duplicate positive and one duplicate negative, were shipped directly from Westover and arrived Saigon by special courier on 8 January 1964. Some additional equipment, purchased locally by Air Force, was airlifted along with the film.

c. Personnel support for the MACV effort has been augmented by the transfer of eight technicians, four of whom are photo interpreters, from the Air Force 67th Recce Tech Squadron in Japan.

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d. Duplicate film of the entire take from the third mission flown on 8 January 1964 was also dispatched by special courier to Saigon. COMUSMACV has not yet requested enlargements for specific targets from this mission. X

3. It appears to be the opinion of DIA and other military officials here that about all the support possible has been given COMUSMACV for maximum use of the latest photography. Information from Saigon via our own channels, however, presents quite a different story.

4. In response to ten specific questions cabled (by Ref. A) to the Saigon station on 13 January (after the augmentation mentioned in paragraph 2 c above), the NPIC representative permanently assigned to the station has outlined in Ref. B an assessment of the MACV photo intelligence capabilities. This cable was followed by observations, as reported in Ref. C, of an NPIC representative who is travelling in the area. In summary, the two cables point out that (a) the total MACV photo intelligence effort is split among several units in Saigon, which in itself presents some confusion, (b) capabilities for coping with the photography are limited, both in personnel and equipment, (c) personnel available are inexperienced and the technicians on TDY from Japan, who handle the initial MACV requirements, are also instructing the assigned personnel in the use of material and equipment, (d) MACV lacks the necessary capabilities for furnishing adequate PI support for counterinsurgency activities, (e) the Saigon station, with only one photo interpreter assigned, at present is the only reliable and rapid source of NVN photography for MACV and is now furnishing the necessary photography in support of Operations Plans 34A and 34B, and (f) MACV facilities, equipment and personnel are inadequate to handle effectively the material from the three BANDSAW missions which have been rushed to Saigon, and it is estimated that it will be another six months or a year before the units involved will be capable of functioning with any degree of efficiency.

5. Recommendations to Headquarters in Ref. C cable from Saigon are presently under study by NPIC and other Agency components.

6. This memorandum has outlined some of the existing problems which obviously must be solved before COMUSMACV can make full use of the photography which is already available. Recommendations pertaining to these problems are presented in a separate memorandum for your consideration.

15/
R. JACK SMITH

Acting Deputy Director (Intelligence)

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